Limitations of OpenFlow Topology Discovery Protocol by Azzouni, Abdelhadi et al.
Limitations of OpenFlow Topology Discovery
Protocol
Abdelhadi Azzouni1, Nguyen Thi Mai Trang1, Raouf Boutaba2, and Guy Pujolle1
1LIP6 / UPMC; Paris, France {abdelhadi.azzouni,thi-mai-trang.nguyen,guy.pujolle}@lip6.fr
2University of Waterloo; Waterloo, ON, Canada rboutaba@uwaterloo.ca
Abstract—OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) is the de-
facto protocol used by OpenFlow controllers to discover the
underlying topology. In this paper, we show that OFDP has
some serious security, efficiency and functionality limitations
that make it non suitable for production deployments. Instead,
we briefly introduce sOFTD, a new discovery protocol with a
built-in security characteristics and which is more efficient than
traditional OFDP.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The separation between the control plane and the data plane
introduced by Software-Defined Networking (SDN) allows
operators to employ quite damn, remarkably cheap but very
fast hardware to forward packets, moving the control logic to
a centralized and much smarter entity called controller. The
controller plays the role of an operating system of the network.
It abstracts the underlying forwarding hardware details and
offers high level APIs that the network admins leverage to
program their networks. One of the fundamental functions
that a controller must offer is an accurate, near real time
visibility of the network topology. This function is known
as Topology Discovery. Topology discovery in SDN is more
sensitive compared to traditional networks based on Link-
State routing protocols like OSPF. In SDN, To discover the
network topology, all current OpenFlow controllers implement
the same protocol OFDP (OpenFlow Discovery Protocol).
Fig. 1. Discovering a unidirectional link in OFDP
Figure 1 shows how OFDP works; To discover the uni-
directional link s1 → s2, the controller encapsulates a LLDP
packet in a Packet-out message and sends it to s1. The packet-
out contains instruction for s1 to send the LLDP packet to
s2 via port p1. By receiving the LLDP packet via port p2,
s2 encapsulates it in a Packet-in message and sends it back
to the controller. The controller receives the LLDP packet
and concludes that there is a unidirectional link from s1 to
s2. The same process is performed to discover the opposite
direction s2 → s1 as well as all other links in the network.
Note that, OFDP packets are sent to a ”normal” multicast
MAC (01:23:00:00:00:01) to avoid being swallowed by 802.1d
compliant switches.
In dynamic networks like large data-centers and multi-
tenant cloud networks, keeping an up-to-date visibility of the
topology is a critical function; Switches leave and join the
network dynamically creating changes in the topology which
affects routing decisions that the controller has to make con-
tinuously. To remain up-to-date, the controller needs to repeat
the process described in figure 1 periodically. The period
separating two discovery rounds must be chosen carefully
based on the dynamicity, size and capacity of the network; A
10 seconds period might not be suitable for a highly dynamic
network as it may introduce a delay of up to 10 seconds.
A short period (e.g. 3 seconds) also might not be suitable
for a less-dynamic large size network as the large number of
frequent discovery packets may exhaust controller’s resources.
Put together, every discovery-round period T , the controller
sends
∑n
i=1 pi (where n is the number of switches and pi is the
number of ports in switch i) Packet-out messages and receives
2L Packet-in messages. [4] proposes to reduce the number of
Packet-out messages to n by rewriting LLDP packet-headers
in the switch.
A non optimized or buggy topology discovery mechanism
can affect routing logic and drastically reduce network per-
formance. Our main goal in this paper is to demonstrate that
OFDP has serious, non-solved yet, security and performance
problems, then we briefly introduce sOFTD (secure and
efficient OpenFlow Topology Discovery), a secure alternative
that is more efficient than OFDP .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In sec-
tion II we demonstrate why OFDP shouldn’t be implemented
in production networks. We introduce our alternative protocol
sOFTD in section III and we conclude the paper in section
IV
II. WHY OFDP SHOULDN’T BE IMPLEMENTED IN
PRODUCTION NETWORKS
A. OFDP is not secure
As implemented by all controllers we have tested
(OpenDaylight [5], Floodlight [6], NOX [7], POX [7],
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
00
70
6v
2 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 12
 M
ay
 20
17
Beacon [8], Ryu [9] and Cisco Open SDN Controller [10]),
OFDP uses clear, non authenticated LLDP packets to detect
links between switches which makes it vulnerable to a
number of attacks:
Switch spoofing. As described in figure 2, each LLDP
packet contains a version field, flags, TTL and TLVs (Type-
length-value) for information advertisement. Mandatory TLVs
in OFDP are ChssisSubtype and PortSubtype to track
packets. In figure 1, the LLDP packet sent by switch s2
to the controller contains the tuple (chassisSubtype =
switch1ID, PortSubtype = p1), hence the controller will
detect that this is the same packet he sent to switch s1 with
p1 as out-port.
Fig. 2. LLDP packet format [2]
Fig. 3. Switch spoofing attack
The problem is that all controllers we have tested set
chassisSubtype value to the MAC address of the local port
of the switch (figure 4), which makes it easy for an adversary
to spoof that switch since controllers use that MAC address as
a unique identifier of the switch. By intercepting clear LLDP
packets containing MAC addresses, a malicious switch can
spoof other switches to falsify the controller’s topology graph.
In the example shown in figure 3, s4 intercepts LLDP packets
from s1 containing s1’s local port MAC address. Now, s4
can use it as its own MAC and reconnect to the controller
as s1 messing up the controller’s topology graph (e.g. the
controller adds nonexistent links s1 → s3 and s3 → s1). We
have tested the switch spoofing attack successfully against
Opendaylight and Floodlight.
Link Fabrication. [1] and [3] pointed out that OFDP
is vulnerable to link fabrication attacks; In figure 5, the
adversary has control over two end-hosts h1 and h2 connected
to switches s1 and s3. h1 sends the LLDP packets received
from s1 to h2 through an out-of-band connection (could be
a tunnel over s2 for example), and h2 replicates them to s3.
Fig. 4. LLDP content used by POX controller
Fig. 5. Link Fabrication attack
The controller receives the LLDP packets from s3 and creates
a link between s1 and s3. While not detected, the fake link
pushes the controller into wrong routing decisions that affects
all communications involving s1 and s3. If the attacker has
control only over h1, but knows the DPID of s3 then he still
can fabricate a unidirectional link s3 → s1 by injecting fake
LLDP packets into s1.
Another form of link fabrication is by LLDP injection;
By monitoring the traffic, the adversary gets the LLDP con-
tent used by the controller. Then, he/she injects the same
LLDP packets into the network creating bogus links between
switches or between the adversary hosts and switches.
[1] proposes to authenticate the LLDP packets by adding
a key-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as an
optional TLV in LLDP packets. As mentioned by the authors,
this technique only works against fake LLDP injection but not
against link fabrication by packet duplication (Figure 5). [3]
proposes a similar technique but using dynamic keys: a unique
key for each LLDP packet assuming that h2, for example,
uses only one example of LLDP packets received from h1 to
generate future fake packets. However, an attacker controlling
both hosts can permanently forward captured LLDP packets
from h1 to h2 and from h2 to h1 and inject them back into
switches without any modification.
Controller fingerprinting. As we explained in a previous
work [11], the LLDP content is different from one controller
to another which allows fingerprinting attacks on SDN con-
trollers. An adversary (h1 in figure 5) matches the LLDP
content he receives from s1 (LLDP packets originate from
the controller) against a controller signature database to detect
which controller is managing the network. Such information
is very useful to launch specific and more efficient attacks on
the controller. Figures 4 and 6 present the LLDP content of
controllers POX and Floodlight respectively. Note also that
the controllers use different default discovery-round periods
which offers another way to differentiate between controllers.
Fig. 6. LLDP content used by Floodlight controller
Fig. 7. LLDP flood attack
Although it is possible that network admins change both
discovery-round period and LLDP content, it is more likely
that the default values are kept unmodified.
LLDP Flood. This is a form of DoS attack where an
adversary generates enough fake LLDP packets to exhaust
the controller resources. In figure 7, host h1 generates large
number of LLDP packets and send them to s1 which has a
rule to forward every LLDP packet to the controller. Hence,
a large number of LLDP packets can exhaust the link con-
necting the switch to the controller as well as the controller
resources. Basic countermeasure methods like port blocking
or packet filtering may not be effective, especially in the case
of very dynamic environments (e.g. multi-tenant cloud) since
connected hosts and switches change frequently, which may
result in preventing legitimate LLDP packets from reaching
the controller.
B. OFDP is not efficient
By using OFDP, the controller periodically sends many
packets to every switch in the network, which could result
in performance decrease of the data plane. Experiments made
on different controllers [12] show that when the network size
(i.e. number of switches) exceeds some threshold, running the
discovery module alone results in significant increase of the
controller’s CPU usage and considerable decrease in network
performance.
C. Other issues
Other issues with OFDP include that it may not reliably
work for heavily loaded links because discovery packets might
get dropped or delayed. Moreover, when using OFDP in a
multi-controller SDN network (e.g. running several guest con-
trollers through FlowVisor), discovery cost increases linearly
as more controllers are added.
III. INTRODUCING SOFTD: SECURE OPENFLOW
TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY
The main idea behind sOFTD is to move a part of the dis-
covery process from the controller to the switch by introducing
minimal changes to the OpenFlow switch design. The main
design characteristics of sOFTD are as follows:
• sOFTD adds a port-liveness-detection mechanism (BFD)
[13] to the switch
• sOFTD uses OpenFlow FAST-FAILOVER groups (op-
tional in OpenFlow 1.1+) to watch switch ports for
connection updates
• sOFTD enables the switch to inform the controller about
port connectivity updates
• The switch has a rule (”drop lldp”) to drop every LLDP
packet to prevent LLDP flood attack
• The controller sends encrypted LLDP packets only when
a switch-port connectivity update occurs and the LLDP
packets are sent only to the concerned switches
• LLDP packets are preceded by rules (with hard timeout
= 1s) to forward them back to the controller. These rules
have a priority higher than ”drop lldp” rules
Since sOFTD do not send periodic discovery packets,
preliminary resuts show significantly better performance than
OFDP. We keep implementation details and results for a future
work.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this short paper, we demonstrated some serious security
and efficiency problems in OpenFlow Discovery Protocol.
Most of these problems are yet unsolved. As an alternative
to OFDP, we briefly introduced our ongoing work, sOFTD
protocol, which consists of moving part of the discovery
intelligence from the controller to the switch by introducing
minimal changes to the OpenFlow switch design.
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